SEATIMES

The Newsletter of the Nautical Professional Education Society of Canada
(Society founded in 1995 by the British Columbia Branch of The Nautical Institute)

May 2026

Voyage of m.v. *Athol*, 1973: *Since 1940 when the "City of Alberni" made her historic voyage for the Canadian Transport Company there have been great improvements in weather forecasting and radio communications and, of course, great changes in the vessels themselves. But for those who undertake the task of delivering our lumber across the seas, the old perils still remain as this published account of the "m.v. Athol's" voyage testifies.*

Captain Ed Monteiro remembers the 50 foot-high wall that roared across the wintry North Pacific and smashed into his 13,000-ton freighter as "the biggest wave I've ever seen" and insists that an act of God saved his ship and crew.

Monteiro is the 33-year old East Indian Master of the Motor Vessel *Athol*, a 439-foot long "Fortune" class freighter built in Japan in 1971. The *Athol* is under charter to Canadian Transport Company.

Last December 3rd, during a storm-plagued voyage from Vancouver Island to Yokohama, Monteiro very nearly lost his first command in a storm of incredible ferocity, battling waves 50 feet high and winds in excess of 100 knots.

CTCo officials have described the young shipper's actions on behalf of his stricken vessel, crew and cargo as a feat of superb seamanship. But the Captain himself says that at the moment of gravest danger when the big wave struck, "I could not have done any more and the vessel was in the hands of God."

The North Pacific passage appears in his log simply as Voyage 10/5. But the eloquent Bombay-born Master talks of that trip, in person and in his formal written report of the voyage with more than a trace of emotion.

MV ATHOL tied up at Port Alberni to load lumber.

Faced worst experience: "When I saw that wave coming there was a moment when I thought we weren't going to make it", he said solemnly. "I doubt very much if this kind of experience will ever happen to me again. I've sailed the North Pacific in winter a number of times but this was the worst experience I've ever had."


SKIPPER Ed Monteiro, left, plots the Athol's course with Chief Mate Inder Kakan.

The *Athol* sailed from Chemainus, B.C. last November 15th with an East Indian crew of 24, carrying 12.3 million board-feet of lumber, including 3 million board feet stowed on deck, mainly in the form of 12-inch thick timbers.

Monteiro had planned to sail the southern route to Japan but he was forced to take the *Athol* along the northern route because of bad weather. He charted a course slightly below the Aleutian Islands and turned northwest.

Captain Ed Monteiro, left, plots the Athol's course with Chief Mate Inder Kakan.

Five days out of Chemainus the *Athol* ran into strong winds and a heavy swell of 16 foot-high waves. In a split second, the timbers stacked 11 feet high on No.1 Hatch shifted forward eight feet. The crew lashed the cargo back into position, but the cargo shifted again a few hours later as the weather continued to deteriorate.

Monteiro anchored the vessel for two days in the relative calm of an Aleutian bay where the crew, equipped with only rudimentary tools, battled the shifted cargo back into place.

Back at sea, the *Athol* had its first serious tangle with the vicious North Pacific winter weather off the Kurile Islands in the late afternoon of November 29th.



"The ship was riding well into the swell but at about 1600 we were hit just abaft the starboard beam by a 30-foot-high wave that came at us from a different direction," said the Captain. The ship rolled over very heavily, to about 36° on the inclinometer.

"We put the helm hard over and changed course immediately but the deck cargo had moved over to port and was jutting out about a foot over the port side. The ship had a list of about 8°. We corrected this by transferring fuel and water. There was a series of about five or six of these waves but it was the first one that hurt us."

Heading straight for us: "On the morning of December 3rd we learned that the storm had changed direction and was heading straight for us. We tried to avoid it by changing course, but we were moving at 15 knots and the storm was travelling at 40 knots."

By mid-afternoon the winds had reached 100 knots and the vessel was rocketing over 30-foot-high waves. "We couldn't get out of it so we brought the ship to a standstill. The quartermaster, my best helmsman, was steering the ship to meet every wave."

"Then we saw it, a half-mile away and moving towards us. A mountainous wave, 50 or 60 feet high – the largest wave I've ever seen in my life. With that kind of monstrous wave and the deck cargo shifted, we didn't have much of a chance.

"We just said our prayers. You can't run away, you have to face it. We turned the ship into it and the vessel started climbing, up, up, up and up, endlessly. It was like a mountain.

"The entire bow of the ship was out of the water. Everything on the bridge and in the chartroom started smashing around. She couldn't climb any further and the crest of the wave broke right above the deck cargo at No.5 Hatch.

"At that instant the chains at No.4 and No.5 Hatches parted with a crack like a pistol shot and the cargo on the starboard side slid into the water, each and every timber. The cargo booms at No.4 and No.5 broke loose and flapped around with a tremendous noise.

"The ship started heading down and the second in the series of these monstrous waves came roaring in. At that time it appeared we'd go right through it and never come up again. But she did come up.... she came up."

The third wave took more of the timbers off the deck. The Captain got on the intercom and ordered his crew to assemble on the boat deck. He told them:

"We have lost our deck cargo. We are in danger. All hands please assemble on the boat deck inside the accommodation. Wear your lifejackets. Do not panic."

As the crew assembled, Monteiro had Chief Mate Inder Kakan, 28, broadcast an urgency message, giving the *Athol's* position: "Deck cargo overboard, ships in vicinity please stand by." The nearest vessel was the *Jagda Asha*, 120 miles from the *Athol.*

The Captain said he and the Chief Mate remained on the bridge and declined to wear lifejackets "for traditional reasons." Helmsman Bachoo Simha, who had been at the wheel for three hours, "declined to be relieved, even to get his lifejacket."

On the boat deck, "there were no visible signs of panic and all were afraid but prepared to face death. All hands were joined as they prayed for survival."

Chances were slim: "It was impossible even to crawl out on deck. Any person who attempted to do so would have been blown overboard. The chances of lowering a lifeboat in such severe conditions were very slim. Besides, the water was too cold. You could last a maximum of perhaps two hours, and the nearest ship was miles away."

The *Athol* smashed through one wave after another. Monteiro says he has the highest respect for the Japanese shipbuilders who put her together so well, but says that if the engines had failed, the freighter would probably have turned turtle and gone under.

"By 1800 I found that things had improved substantially and the swell was down to 30 feet. To keep the crew occupied I ordered the Chief Steward to get dinner organized. I went back on the intercom and said that we appeared to be safe."

Ventilator located between hatches 4 & 5 as found broken, showing severity of rough seas.

The following day the storm had subsided and Monteiro put the *Athol* back on course for Japan. The *Athol* had lost a quarter of her deck cargo, No.4 boom "appeared

ghastly, bent and twisted", two ventilators had been sheared off and the single screw propeller was fouled by a half-ton of wire that had gone overboard.
Despite the damage, the *Athol* declined all offers of assistance and continued to Japan with a 3° list to starboard. Miraculously, not a single crewmember had been lost or injured.
The North Pacific took one final shot at the *Athol* on December 7th, one day out of Yokohama, hitting the vessel with 20-foot waves and winds up to 50 knots. A few more timbers were lost but there was no further damage to the ship.
Monteiro anchored in Yokohama harbour and ordered "finished with engines" at 0812 on December 8th, "to close a long and hazardous voyage" of 23 days' duration that covered 5,425 miles. The trip usually covers about 4,320 miles in less than 14 days.
Since that time, not a single member of the *Athol's* crew has left the ship. "I am extremely proud of my crew and they are still with me. I guess this kind of experience makes us a very close family."

Also see https://open.library.ubc.ca/collections/macmillan/items/1.0351894

This article appeared in a 1974 edition of "MB News", the periodical of the MacMillan Bloedel Forestry Company. **For a more detailed account of the voyage see https://npesc.ca/m-v-athol-report-of-voyage-10-5**

(Captain Monteiro was the first Chairman of the Nautical Professional Education Society of Canada)

On our Forum: Assessing the risks of today's "normal" productivity demands on ship captains…

By: Maritime Magazine. February 17th 2026
https://maritimemag.com/en/assessing-the-risks-of-todays-normal-productivity-demands-on-ship-captains/

There can be few who were even remotely surprised at the guilty verdict and six-year jail sentence for the master of the container feeder ***Solong***, which plunged like a misguided missile into the side of the anchored ***Stena Immaculate*** off the Humber last March. There seemed to have been no rational explanation for the incident, which killed one of the *Solong's* crew and wiped out his ship, which failed to make any alteration of course before the fatal collision.

Nobody would suggest that the sentence was unduly harsh, the Russian master, who has been held in custody since his arrest shortly after being rescued, doubtless being thought a "flight risk". The fact that the tanker was US registered and carrying a military cargo may well have weighed upon the minds of police investigators, and others. But geo-politics aside, there are perhaps wider questions that this incident, among the worst of recent navigational calamities, should provoke.

It might, for instance, be asked why the master of a sizeable ship, was keeping a navigational watch as a matter of routine. In the world of containerships, this was just an insignificant feeder, but was nevertheless the dimensions of an ocean-going ship which, in an earlier age, would have had a deck department of at least three officers to keep the watches and sufficient ratings to assist. The answer is quite obvious; in the "normalisation" of such manning in these trades; something that has come about without any proper discussions, driven purely by the need to stay competitive. If company A can make do in such a "schooner-rigged" fashion,

then companies B, C, D etc must follow, if they are to satisfy charterers looking for their pound of flesh and keep their business.

Is it reasonable for the master of a ship, which is being driven hard in an unremitting service in which the maintenance of a schedule is paramount, to be expected to act as an OOW (Officer of the Watch)? It is also worth considering what will be expected of masters, additional to their watchkeeping and supervisory duties before, during and after the vessel's numerous port calls, with innumerable calls upon their time, from the terminal staff and all the other well-rested officials who demand attention. An unending requirement for reporting, bureaucratic demands whizzing into the email inbox, all wanting instant answers.

Impact of fatigue in watchkeeping: Masters of these ships, in regular trades, are often expected to hold pilotage exemptions and to handle their ships, in what may be long, estuarial pilotages. Might fatigue just possibly be a contributor to some – even most – of these navigational accidents, which now seem to be almost accepted as part of the price of progress in keeping the logistics chain bar-tight? In the current journal of the International Federation of Ship Masters' Associations is a sad observation about the premature retirement of a ro-ro master, whose health was breaking down due to the pressure of multiple port calls. The Nautical Institute "Seaways", in its current issue, has a whole collection of accounts of fatigue-related accidents, along with some thought-provoking articles about the reality of life at sea today.

There is nothing even remotely revelatory about all this; there have been warning after warning, but beyond bureaucratic changes around "hours of rest" requirements which has given rise to creative reporting, little has been done to address the real issues.

Clever manufacturers produce equipment that produces precision navigation solutions, but relegates the fatigued OOW to the role of a machine-minder, alarm-canceller and a pair of bleary eyes. Brilliant engineers produce port equipment that will halve the time in port for a turn-round, to huge congratulations from everyone, except perhaps for the ships' crews, who will have to do the same jobs, but in half the time. Bullying greens persuade ship operators to slow ships down at sea to save the planet, requiring ports to look to their even greater efficiencies.

And at the end of all this progress are to be found the human beings who run the ships, the only folk who do not get a full night's sleep, and find that they start nodding off at the controls, as the cumulative effects of sleep loss build up. It is worth noting that it is the health of frail human beings who have paid the price for the astonishing improvement in productivity that is represented in modern shipping.

Who thought it such a tremendous wheeze to get rid of the radio officer, just at a time when bureaucracy was multiplying and ship-shore communications were getting out of hand? The same great financial brains who have halved the manpower available, but doubled the workload of the survivors. The human price has been more than those whose lives and careers have been ruined in accidents and poor health, as the enjoyment has been leached out of seafaring, and that should matter to us all.

A US Navy oiler ran hard aground after its captain urged a last-minute shortcut: 'Let's try to shoot the gap'

Just after noon in the northern Arabian Sea, the captain of a US Navy fuel ship gave the order to take a shortcut through risky waters rather than take a longer, safer route to their destination.

Two hours later, the 677-foot replenishment oiler USNS *Big Horn* struck the sea floor at high speed, shaking violently as the vessel ran aground. Music was audible on the bridge as sailors missed key navigational warnings.

The Navy command investigation obtained by Business Insider said that the September 2024 incident, initially characterized as an allision, was caused by "a series of poor decisions, failure to follow procedure, application of open water navigation to restricted waters, and failure to exhibit proper risk calculation." The ship suffered more than $20 million in damage.

The replenishment oiler USNS Big Horn ran aground in the Middle East after the captain decided to take a risky shortcut.

The Navy's investigation, the details of which have not previously been made public, reveals that the captain and his watchstanders failed to prepare for the shortcut and failed to monitor navigation alerts that could have averted disaster at the last minute.

"The grounding was preventable," investigators wrote.

The investigation recommended administrative or disciplinary action against *Big Horn's* captain and several officers. Military Sealift Command said that both the captain and the ship's navigator are still employed. It is unclear if they will be permitted to hold their positions again.

"Pursuant to the investigation, all administrative and disciplinary matters were submitted for appropriate review," command spokesperson Jillian Morris said in response to Business Insider's query on accountability and discipline. "However, to protect employee privacy, we do not comment on, nor share the details of, the outcome of those matters."

Making a risky choice: Shortly after 12 p.m. local time on September 23, the *Big Horn* was wrapping up its final replenishment-at-sea with ships from the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group.

The next move for the Henry J. Kaiser-class replenishment oiler, which refuels warships at sea, was to sail from the northern Arabian Sea to the Duqm port in Oman for a scheduled visit.

The new navigator was drafting route options for the captain to get the *Big Horn* to a pickup point, where the oiler would embark a harbor pilot to guide the ship into port.

During a conversation with another officer, the transcript of which is included in the Navy's investigation, the navigator expressed concerns about running aground on a particular route and said they preferred an option through deeper water.

The navigator told the officer that they could take the riskier shortcut and save time. "I'm just scared of right here," they said, "scared of these shallow points." The officer said they should present the shortcut to the captain.

The officer said "ask the captain and say, 'This route is about 10 miles shorter but goes through this. Do you feel comfortable?'"

One route, known as Duqm A, was shorter but ran through known shoal areas. Duqm B was a "deep water" path that added several miles to the journey to the rendezvous point.

Just before 12:30 p.m., with the last replenishment-at-sea ongoing, the navigator asked the captain which route they preferred.

"Let's try to shoot the gap there," the captain told the navigator, selecting the Duqm A route, even though it threaded a gap between charted shoals dangerously close to the oiler's draft. The navigator said that they had checked on the under keel clearance, to which the captain replied: "Rad."

The Navy investigation into the grounding that followed that decision said that there was no indication that the captain reviewed a paper chart during the decision-making process.

'Slow down, slow down, slow down': About an hour later, at roughly 1:30 p.m., the *Big Horn* completed its final replenishment-at-sea and set out for the pick-up point for the harbour pilot. Pilots are standard for most harbour approaches because they have the local knowledge to help ship captains navigate through tight channels.

Duqm A took the *Big Horn* through a gap between two charted areas of shoal — or shallow — water known as the San Carlos Banks that were not deep enough for the oiler.

Navy investigators wrote that "attention to detail and consideration of the risks should have negated Duqm A as an option."

The Big Horn sailed through the San Carlos Banks at 17 to 18 knots. In transit, the ship's system triggered safety alarms. They were silenced but had visual cues; there is no indication that they were acknowledged.

Meanwhile, the ship's fathometer — which measures water depth under the hull — showed the water growing progressively shallower.

At 2:12 p.m., the vessel began vibrating as it struck the sea floor.

"Slow down, slow down, slow down," the captain said. "We must have hit a shallow spot somewhere, but there is nothing on the chart," he said moments later as the ship came to a full stop.

Crew members reported fuel leaks on both main engines.

"We must have hit a shallow spot. We must have hit a sand bank," the captain said.

The damaged oiler was anchored and later towed into Duqm.

A 'preventable' blunder: Investigators found that the members of the bridge team appeared "unreasonably" focused on meeting a 3 p.m. harbour pilot pick-up time, which contributed to the decision to take the risky shortcut at high speeds.

"We gotta haul ass," the navigator told an officer at one point. In a separate conversation with the captain, they said they believed they could make it, if only slightly behind schedule.

"If we cut corners we'll get there," the captain said, per the investigation.

"Yes sir!" the navigator replied. That was minutes before the ship ran aground.

Although the captain later said he did not believe he was operating in restricted waters and was unaware of any safety hazards or navigational concerns, investigators concluded that the Duqm A track met the definition of restricted waters under Navy policy, meaning a formal navigation brief should have been conducted before entering the area.

"However, no members of the bridge team, including the Captain and Navigator, seemed to realize they were steaming into restricted waters," the investigation said. "No consideration was given for a required navigation brief, a more detailed plan, or thorough review of the proposed track prior to steaming through."

The command investigation also found that, when the *Big Horn* ran aground, the ship was operating with two separate electronic navigation chart databases, and there was some confusion among the officers about which one was in use at the time. Safety contours and the shoal area were not clearly displayed.

Records indicate there was music was playing on the bridge up until the grounding. Tug boats brought the Big Horn into port the following day.

The grounding caused extensive damage to the *Big Horn's* hull, internal support structures, port propeller, and port rudder. According to Navy cost breakdowns, expenses included roughly $7.5 million for towing, $8.6 million for services in Oman, $1.9 million for fuel offloading, and $2.4 million in additional costs in the US — totalling more than $20 million.

BUSINESS INSIDER

March 11th 2026

https://www.businessinsider.com/us-navy-ship-grounded-after-captain-urged-last-minute-shortcut-2026-3

Maritime Magazine

The 2026 Spring edition of "Maritime Magazine" can be found at: -

https://maritimemag.com/en/3d-flip-book/magazine-120/

Port of Churchill and Fednav to assess operational needs for year-round shipping

Arctic Gateway Group (AGG) has partnered with Canadian shipping company Fednav to examine the operational requirements that would be necessary to support year-round shipping from the Port of Churchill. The work for this review is underway and is expected to be completed this summer, AGG indicated in a press release from Winnipeg.



Fednav's work with AGG will focus on understanding the practical operational considerations of navigating ice-covered waters in Hudson Bay. This work is intended to inform Arctic Gateway's long-term business planning, and does not pre-empt environmental assessments, regulatory processes, or Indigenous decision-making. The work will examine known ice conditions, patterns, extended shipping seasons, and the efforts and investments required.

Any future consideration of year-round shipping or icebreaking would require extensive engagement with Indigenous partners, northern communities, governments, and environmental stakeholders.

"This is about business planning, and it's one piece of a broader set of work being advanced in Hudson Bay. We're doing this with full recognition that all future paths involve extensive consultation, regulatory review, and alignment with Indigenous partners, communities, governments, and industry," said Chris Avery, CEO, Arctic Gateway Group.

The expansion of trade corridors and investments in Western Hudson Bay is currently the subject of extensive, multi-party research and planning. This includes work led by the Arctic Research Foundation in collaboration with provincial and federal partners examining shipping routes, environmental considerations, marine conservation, and governance, as well as a feasibility initiative exploring a potential national marine conservation area led by Parks Canada.

AGG's work with Fednav is complementary to these broader initiatives. It is focused on understanding what the Port of Churchill would require from an operational perspective, informed by a commercial shipping company that is actively involved in year-round operations in the Canadian Arctic. An executive summary will also be available to research organizations and government partners to help inform the wider body of work underway in Hudson Bay.

"Supporting shipping in this region requires a clear understanding of ice conditions and patterns to identify operational capabilities," said Isabelle Brassard, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer at Fednav. "This work applies Fednav's Arctic experience to help identify what would be required to safely support year-round shipping from the Port of Churchill."

Fednav will draw on decades of Arctic operating experience, including Arctic-certified captains and in-house ice specialists, to assess historical ice conditions, navigation constraints, and operational requirements specific to Hudson Bay and the marine approaches to Churchill. **February 25th 2026.**

https://maritimemag.com/en/port-of-churchill-partners-with-fednav-to-assess-operational-needs-for-year-round-shipping/

(Photos of Port of Churchill and Fednav ship in Hudson Strait)

The old school: In these days of shipmanagers it is difficult to recall that there was once a time when some shipowners knew all the seafarers who worked for them. At least, they gave that impression.
Lawrence Holt, one-time senior partner of the Blue Funnel Line, certainly knew well all his senior officers and cadets, together with many of the senior ratings.
After a completed voyage he would interview the Master and Chief Engineer and, if the voyage had been economically successful, they would receive a bonus.
Whenever it was practical he would also visit a ship before she sailed from Liverpool and greet her upon her return.



Such men become the subject of legend, and stories of Lawrence Holt were legion within the Blue Funnel fleet, a fleet that at one time numbered over a hundred Homeric heroes – *Ajax, Diomed, Agamemnon* and the rest.
The senior partner was not a dressy man. His garb for ship visiting was an old trilby hat and a raincoat, which had seen better days. His staff tried to keep up with him and, if he left his headquarters in India Buildings to visit a vessel, the Master would normally receive a warning, not from Lawrence but from someone else at head office who had been detailed to keep a watching brief. Even so, he could defeat them.
A newly promoted Chief Officer was keeping a weather eye open for him on one occasion, only to discover that he was already on board enjoying a cup of tea with the cook. In his trilby hat and dirty raincoat he had sneaked aboard unrecognized.
In the same garb he was said to have been hailed from a ship coming alongside and asked to receive a line to help secure her. He did so but afterwards he sent a bill to the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board to secure payment for his services in berthing the ship.
In the half-deck – the Cadets' or Midshipmen's' quarters – he supplied the textbooks necessary to their craft, volumes of seamanship and navigation, and urged the young men to study them when he saw them off on one occasion.
On their return he asked if the books had been read and was solemnly assured that they had. Rifling through the pages of one he dislodged pound notes that he had put there when the vessel sailed. "I see," he remarked, pocketing the money, "that you had no use for these".
Shipmanagers in today's industry, one fears, are really not quite of that same ilk.

(Ronald Hope - "Of Shoes & Ships" Fairplay Magazine. February 7th 1991.)

DESGAGNÉS reports safe return from Persian Gulf of three trainees of the Institut Maritime du Québec

DESGAGNÉS is pleased to confirm that the three trainees from the *Institut maritime du Québec* (IMQ) who were aboard the vessels ***N/M Rosaire A. Desgagnés*** and ***N/M Miena Desgagnés***, trapped in the Persian Gulf since February 28, have returned to Quebec.

Due to ongoing uncertainty regarding the timeline for implementing security measures that would allow the two vessels to leave the Persian Gulf via the Strait of Hormuz, DESGAGNÉS, in collaboration with the IMQ, implemented a repatriation plan for the three trainees aboard the two vessels.

DESGAGNÉS, local maritime agents, and Saudi authorities worked together to ensure that the trainees could first take a safe flight from Saudi Arabia to Europe and then continue their journey to Canada.

For its part, the IMQ provided support services to the trainees on board and their families from the outset of the conflict in the Middle East and throughout the repatriation process, including personalized psychosocial support tailored to each individual's needs.

Rosaire A. Desgagnés

The trainees were aboard the two DESGAGNÉS vessels as part of a sea training program required for their college diploma (DEC) in Navigation and a deck officer's certificate issued by Transport Canada, both of which are necessary to pursue a maritime career aboard a merchant marine vessel.

DESGAGNÉS sincerely thanks the crews aboard the M/V *Rosaire A. Desgagnés* and M/V *Miena Desgagnés*, local maritime agents, and Saudi authorities for their outstanding cooperation, which enabled the safe repatriation of the trainees.

Miena Desgagnés

To protect their privacy, the trainees and their families wish to remain anonymous. They will therefore not be granting any interviews at this time.

Desgagnés is very pleased with the resolution of this situation and wishes the trainees a safe return home, thanking them for their resilience during this tumultuous period.

Maritime Magazine. March 20th 2026

https://maritimemag.com/en/desgagnes-reports-safe-return-from-persian-gulf-of-three-trainees-of-the-institut-maritime-du-quebec/

Sailors' Society calls for culture change to protect digital native cadets

The Sailors' Society has released its fourth annual Cadet Report, titled "The first digital seafarer generation", painting a complex portrait of a workforce that is more connected but also more vulnerable than those who came before. Drawing on data from more than 2,600 cadets, trainees, and ratings across 30 countries, the report warns that the maritime industry's future leaders are navigating psychological pressures that no previous generation has faced.

While reliable internet is pivotal for mental health – with 70%of seafarers stating onboard internet has a positive impact on wellbeing – it has become a double-edged sword. The report from the charity highlights that "digital addiction" is emerging strongly among young seafarers. In Southeast Asia and Europe, where screen time is highest, approximately 70 to 75% of respondents report feeling some level of addiction to their devices.

The psychological toll of this connectivity is regional. In China and Southeast Asia, roughly 80% of cadets feel significant pressure to "appear happy or successful" on social media. Johan Smith, head of wellness at Sailors' Society, noted that while social media provides belonging, "unmanaged pressures can compound isolation and undermine wellbeing". One cadet respondent captured the sentiment: "If we use social media and forget we have prior commitments – that's addiction and that's not good".

Perhaps the most troubling findings involve safety and harassment. While legal literacy is high in some regions – 63% of Indian subcontinent cadets say they know their rights "very well" – trust in the systems meant to protect them is "very fragile".

The report identifies a "generational gap" where old traditions of toughness collide with new values of inclusivity. For many, the "retaliation culture" is a lived reality. In Europe, only 15% of cadets feel they know their rights very well, and the region shows the highest level of cynicism regarding reporting. "I've heard when you report it, it's brushed off as ship-life… so why bother?" one cadet remarked. Another participant stated: "It seems outrageous to me that cases of bullying and harassment at sea are not treated as seriously as they are on land".

In response to these pressures, the report finds that the new generation is moving away from formal welfare channels in favour of their peers. Peer support groups are now a "practical and preferred route" for mental health assistance. Across all regions, seafarers would use YouTube, music, or social media as their first port of call if feeling mentally unwell. To meet this need, the Sailors' Society has expanded its Sea Mate program, which trains crew members as wellness officers to provide psychological support while at sea.

The report concludes with 10 strategic recommendations for the industry to shift digital life from a source of pressure to a source of connection. Key suggestions include: audit connectivity policies to prioritize "connection windows" for family contact over unlimited, high-stress scrolling; train senior officers in digital-era leadership to recognise signs of digital stress and anxiety in their subordinates; normalise realistic communication by discouraging "perfect image" narratives in corporate recruitment and messaging; and integrate digital life into fatigue management, acknowledging that late-night scrolling contributes to sleep debt and operational risk. Ultimately, the report argues that the future of safe shipping will be defined by how well the industry protects its people. As Sailors' Society CEO Sara Baade noted, this generation is not just joining the industry; it is reshaping it. The challenge for shipping companies is "not simply to provide internet or policies, but to build cultures of care".

https://splash247.com/sailors-society-calls-for-culture-change-to-protect-digital-native-cadets/ **March 18th 2026**

$350 million settlement reached in Baltimore Bridge Collapse Case

ACE American Insurance Company has reached a $350 million settlement with the owner and operator of the container ship *Dali*, Grace Ocean and Synergy Marine Group, following the 2024 collapse of Baltimore's Francis Scott Key Bridge. The agreement, matching the insurer's payout to Maryland, is one of the first ahead of a major civil trial set for June, though broader litigation continues with total damages expected to exceed $5 billion. A key issue at trial will be whether the ship interests can limit their liability to about $44 million under maritime law.

Baltimore Bridge Collapse – Watch the Full PBS Documentary at: -
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aE7i201jc_A

LNG Ship's Cargo Tank. This is the inside of an LNG cargo tank on a modern LNG carrier. It may look like a metallic maze, but every layer is carefully engineered to safely contain the Liquefied Natural Gas at -162ºC. Most modern LNG ships use the Gaztransport & Technigaz membrane system, where the tank is built directly into the ship's hull using a layered containment system rather than separate spherical tanks.



In the heart of this system is the primary containment. This is the layer that directly holds the LNG. It is made from thin corrugated materials such as stainless steel or Invar (a nickel-steel alloy). The corrugated design is critical because it allows the material to expand and contract under extreme cold without cracking or failing. It's a cryogenic material because LNG is extremely cold.

Behind this sits the insulation system which is what is most visible in the image. These are prefabricated insulation boxes made from materials like reinforced polyurethane foam or perlite-filled panels. Their role is to minimize heat entering the tank and maintain the extremely low temperature required to keep the gas in liquid form.

Next is the secondary containment system which acts as a backup safety layer in the unlikely event that the primary barrier fails. This layer prevents the LNG from reaching the ship's hull. It is typically made from composite materials such as Triplex, combining aluminium foil and fibreglass for strength and impermeability.

There is also a secondary layer of insulation that adds further thermal protection and structural support, ensuring stability throughout the voyage.
All these layers sit against the ship's inner hull which is shielded from the extreme cold. Without this protection the steel of the hull would become brittle and unsafe.
In simple terms, the primary barrier holds the LNG, the secondary barrier provides backup protection, and the insulation keeps everything cold and stable. What you are looking at is not just a tank, but a highly engineered cold containment system that makes global LNG transportation possible. https://www.instagram.com/p/DWW2jUuCi8O/

Correspondence

Hello, it has been a year since I was graciously awarded the Captain Brian Silvester Award. Since

then I have successfully acquired my Master 150 gross ton Domestic Certificate of Competency. I have been promoted to Captain aboard the vessel that I was working on – a 90' 114-year old, passenger carrying, refurbished tug, mv *Swell*.

The bursary allowed me to take extra time off work to prepare for my oral exam.

A little bit about the company I work for, Maple Leaf Adventures, and the types of trips that we do. We take guests on 5 – 11 day trips up and down the B.C. Coast and Alaska exploring remote areas, viewing wildlife, and learning about indigenous culture. MV *Swell* carries 12 passengers and 6 crew.

The current trip that I am running started in Campbell River and takes guests on an 8-day trip through Desolation Sound, Johnstone Strait, the Broughton Islands and drops them off in Port McNeil.

I will then transit the vessel north, without passengers, around Cape Caution to Bella Bella on an 8-day cruise through the central and north coast, dropping guests off in Kitimat.

I am truly grateful for the financial assistance from the NPESC. It helped me purse my Captain's ticket and got me to where I am right now, as I write this at anchor in beautiful Prideaux Haven as Master of a historic vessel.

Regards, Captain Bryan Bowles. May 8th 2026

Revised IMO recommendations for entering enclosed spaces aboard ships

Enclosed space entry remains a safety challenge in ship operations and for seafarers' working conditions. On 27 June 2025, the IMO adopted revised recommendations for entering enclosed spaces aboard ships, to be handled in accordance with the SMS systematics. This statutory news summarizes this topic.

NEED TO KNOW

- Continued failure to systematically identify the hazards, assess risks and implement appropriate entry procedures remains a significant factor in many accidents.
- The SMS must be reviewed to ensure safety related to enclosed spaces.
- Organizational leadership on board and ashore is crucial for successful implementation of measures.
- Empowering shipboard staff to make the right decisions is essential.

Read the full article about the IMO recommendations for ENCLOSED SPACES at: -
https://www.dnv.com/news/2026/revised-imo-recommendations-for-entering-enclosed-spaces-aboard-ships/

The following story is from a letter appearing in the April 1980 edition of "Sea Breezes". L. Roskell, the author had written after seeing a story about the *Calvittoria*, a ship that had been the *Mendoza Star.*

With Blue Star Line through Magellan: I joined the *Mendoza Star* as Third Mate in the River Blackwater, near West Mersea in Essex where she was laid up in the summer of 1966 by a seaman's strike. A few days later, in common with many other ships around the coast of the U.K. at that time, we went to sea with no definite orders other than to proceed in the general direction of South America. We took bananas from Santos to the River Plate and received a charter to carry chilled and frozen meat from there to Valparaiso via the Magellan Straits, topping off with frozen lamb at a place called Puerto Bories, somewhere in the Patagonian Channels. Having previously traded no further south than Central Argentina I found the prospect of visiting Patagonia fascinating.



Our pilot had boarded in Montevideo and would only take over from us when we had well and truly entered the eastern end of the Straits. To make his point he had noticeably stayed away from the bridge during the run from the River Plate southwards and was somewhat taken aback when he did come up to find us heading into the night at 17 knots, **without a radar set**, it being company policy, at that time, not to provide them for purely cargo vessels.

At Punta Arenas we picked up the pilot with the special licence to take us through the Kirke Narrows and on to Puerto Bories. This part of the voyage, in the vicinity of Punta Arenas, was undertaken at night, which entailed many journeys from chartroom to top compass platform and back via the wheelhouse muttering compass bearings and occasional oaths concerning ships without wing repeaters. The pilot sadly watched the rapid progress of the chaotic cross bearings and adjusted our course as necessary with urgent grunts to the helmsman.

To negotiate the Kirke Narrows at the mountainous western side of the region involved an extraordinary ritual. As far as I can remember, slack water occurred only once each day in daylight, lasting for about four or five minutes, and it was during this time and no other that the gap could be negotiated. Between rock walls several hundred feet high, a long narrowing approach

terminated at the Islas Zeta beyond which was the vast expanse of the Canal Valdés. The channel at this bottleneck was 100 metres wide between the shoal off Punta Restinga and the Isla Merino. Although the tide rose only between two and three feet, it tore through this particular gap at 10 knots and around the north side of the tiny island at 14 knots, causing eddies that would render any vessel uncontrollable.

On this occasion it had been arranged for a motor launch to set out from Punta Bories to meet us and, as we cautiously entered the approaches to the narrows, we could just make it out through our binoculars, clinging somehow against the rocky margin of the southern shore. The little boat was there to watch the surface of the water for the first sign of the slack. We waited for over an hour before we saw it venture across the gap; as it did so we heard the sound of a horn and could make out a tiny figure waving a flag. A pre-arranged "double ring ahead" signalled to the engineers that this was our big moment and we were soon pounding towards the Narrows. For all our speed of reaction, the tide began to turn and run with us and our speed was greatly enhanced as we raced through the little gap to emerge like a cork from a bottle on to the choppy, green surface of Canal Valdés.

One can only speculate as to the adventures the original explorers must have had, but Puerto Bories lies at the end of Estero Ultima Esperanza, which I believe means "Last Hope Sound". That may give us a clue.

How far is an oil tanker escorted after it leaves the Westridge Marine Terminal in Burnaby BC?



The image above is from the "Vessel Finder" (https://www.vesselfinder.com/) display at 2026hrs on Monday April 20th. In the "Vessel Finder" display, General Cargo Ships are shown in Yellow, Tankers in Brown and Tugs in Blue. These vessels are in a position northwest of Cape Flattery in Washington State, where the Juan da Fuca Strait meets the Pacific Ocean.
Close by the *CSL Frontier*, a Self-Unloading General Cargo Ship with a destination of Santa Rosalia in Mexico, is the *CSK Endeavour*, a Crude Oil Tanker bound for Ningbo, China. The tug *SST Grizzly* is her escort. To the west of these is the Crude Oil Tanker *Proteus Jessica* which is heading to Singapore. Her escort, the *SST Orca,* having completed its task, has turned and is shown returning to the Burrard Inlet.

A unique chemical tanker enters the Odfjell fleet

Named after a Norse explorer, *Bow Erikson* is ready to chart new waters in Odfjell's decarbonization journey: Equipped with gate rudder and sails, the newbuilt vessel sets a new benchmark for energy efficiency in her class.

A class of its own

The advanced technology sets *Bow Erikson* apart from her peers: Compared to the average tanker in this class, energy efficiency is improved by 50%.

Two innovations are central to this performance:
Gate rudder and wind-assisted propulsion sails (WAPS).

The gate rudder – an industry-first for chemical tankers – is an advanced steering system featuring two vertical foils on either side of the propeller. Unlike conventional rudders, it interacts directly with the propeller's slipstream, generating added lift and thrust while steering. The result is improved propulsion efficiency and reduced emissions.

Read the full report at: -
https://www.odfjell.com/about/our-stories/a-unique-chemical-tanker-enters-the-odfjell-fleet/
For Gate Rudders read: -
https://www.wartsila.com/marine/products/propulsors-and-gears/energy-saving-technology/gate-rudder-tm

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Vancouver Transportation Foundation Scholarships for 2025

On May 13th 2026 Captain Stan Bowles attended the Marine Campus of BCIT to present certificates to award winners who had been at sea when certificates for this award were first presented. On this occasion Captain Bowles was able to present certificates to Nautical Science Cadets Kayley McEachern, Joseph Wang and Seth Cutter-Stovicek.



Connecting and promoting Canada's marine industry

https://bcmarine.org/activities/

Scholarships: This year the Nautical Professional Education Society administered the WMCC annual scholarship. Five $2,000.00 scholarships were offered and thirteen applications were received from students engaged is Nautical Science or Marine Engineering programs at Camosun College, the Western Maritime Institute and the Marine Campus of BCIT.

The Selection Committee met, in person or virtually, on May 7th to discuss and judge the applications. That meeting resulted in five students each receiving one of this year's scholarships. They are: -

James Dean	Camosun College
Thi Bich Van Luu	BCIT Marine Campus
Roseanne Reid	Western Maritime Institute
Harmanpreet Kaur Sandhu	BCIT Marine Campus
Tait Stevens	BCIT Marine Campus

Your Society.

Do you wish to make a financial contribution to the NPESC? Is it time for you to renew your membership? The Annual Membership Fee remains at $40.00 but any amount that you can donate will be greatly appreciated.

The Society is able to accept Membership Fees or Donations via e-transfer by using the email address treasurer@npesc.ca, or you may send a cheque payable to: -

NPESC, c/o 1004 – 110 Brew Street, Port Moody, BC V3H 0E4

Tax Receipts will be issued promptly in return by the Treasurer.

Thank you.

Contributions to the NPESC are tax deductible. Charitable Registration # 891775447 RR0001

Nautical Professional Education Society of Canada
Founded by The Nautical Institute of BC

Articles or comments for inclusion in future editions of Seatimes can be sent to me at whitknit@telus.net
David Whitaker FNI

The Nautical Institute
British Columbia Branch